Book Review on  The Philosophical Challenge from China (Edited by Brian Bruya) by VAN EYGHEN, HANS
Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016)                                                                                   VAN EYGHEN 
Comparative Philosophy Volume 7, No. 1 (2016): 90-95 
Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014 
www.comparativephilosophy.org 
 
 
RECENT WORK 
 
 
BOOK REVIEW ON  
THE PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGE FROM CHINA (EDITED BY BRIAN BRUYA) 
 
HANS VAN EYGHEN 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Philosophical Challenge from China (Bruya 2015a) aims at enriching western 
philosophy with Chinese thought. In the introduction, Brian Bruya laments about the 
lack of interest in Chinese philosophers, claiming that “a minor Western philosopher 
such as Anselm garners more attention in PHD programs than the entire Chinese 
tradition combined” (Bruya 2015b: xv). Bruya’s claim is hard to verify, but a 
comparison between the search results from Google Scholar for Western philosophers 
like Aristotle (975,000), Willard Van Orman Quine (166,000) and Anselm (183,000) to 
those for Chinese philosophers like Confucius (114,000), Mencius (26,200) and 
Zhuang Zi (19,300) signals that he has a point.1 In order to mend this lacuna, 13 
contributors were invited to discuss topics that are recognizable to philosophers 
working in one of the many subfields of analytic philosophy in relation to Chinese 
thought. According to Bruya, enriching Western philosophy can come in a number of 
ways. He writes: “[I]t [Chinese philosophy] would advance the current discussion (…) 
[by] supporting a minority view with a pervasive new argument, contradicting a 
prominent position, and (…) demonstrating that the issue has a significant dimension 
that has been neglected (…).” (Bruya 2015b: xv) The remainder of the book shows that 
‘bringing the current philosophical discussion to a higher level’ should be added to 
bruya’s list.  
   Bruya also briefly discusses a familiar worry of comparative philosophers, namely 
that Western categories are forced upon Chinese thought and Chinese philosophy is 
thereby assimilated to Western concerns. Bruya responds that the book is categorized 
using human issues and not particularly Western or Chinese issues (Bruya 2015b). The ____________________________	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division of chapters under the headers “moral psychology”, “political philosophy and 
ethics” and “metaphysics and epistemology”, raises doubts whether this is indeed the 
case. None of the three can properly be called human issues and clearly seem to be 
Western categories. It is doubtful that non-western philosophers will adhere to a clear 
cut distinction between “moral psychology” and “ethics” (Mencius for example likely 
will not) or between “ethics” and “metaphysics” (Daoists likely will not). Some 
scholars will object to this approach but it is fairly similar to the way ancient and 
medieval philosophers are treated in present-day analytic philosophy. Modern Western 
categories are also different from ancient and medieval categories to some extent but 
current analytic philosophers are able to do justice to the thought of Aristotle, Aquinas 
or Anselm within modern categories. Although something might be lost, this approach 
is warranted because there is no real alternative. 
 
2. MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
The first paper addresses psychological bias in judging one’s own character compared 
to judging someone else’s (Sarkissian 2015). Hagop Sarkissian cites Susan Wolf who 
argues that giving others the benefit of the doubt is a disposition of the moral saint. 
Giving other the benefit of the doubt should be understood as being charitable in 
judging others and refraining from blaming. Sarkissian finds a predecessor of Wolf’s 
ideas in Confucius’ analects. In it, Confucius holds that when explaining another’s 
behavior, one ought to look beyond that person’s motivations and character traits to 
external contextual factors that could explain her behavior. According to Confucius, 
judging others less harshly will have positive effects on the judging subject itself. 
Many psychological experiments show that people tend not to be moral saints and 
judge others much more harshly than they judge themselves. Nonetheless, game theory 
teaches us that giving others the benefit of the doubt will be beneficial in the long run 
and thus seems to provide support for Confucius’ claim.  
  David B. Wong has Mencius’ conception of moral sprouts and their developments 
weigh in on the Western discussion over the role of emotion and reason in virtue ethics 
(Wong 2015). Wong’s paper is a clear example of how Chinese thought can provide 
new arguments for a minority position in Western philosophy. Mencius’ ideas put the 
emphasis on the pre-theoretical, and thus the emotional aspects of moral life rather than 
on the rational aspects. From the emotional aspects, “patterns of suffering” emerge. In 
order to be mindful of the patterns of suffering, persons should weigh their reasons, so 
Mencius’ account is not wholly emotional. With his paper, Wong succeeds in bringing 
the debate between emotional and rational accounts of virtue ethics to a higher level by 
showing how Mencius’ ideas assign a role to both. Mencius’ view can still be counted 
among the emotional accounts but his ideas can aid in overcoming the standoff 
between both sides of the debate.  
  Bongrae Seok also discusses Mencius’ moral psychology (Seok 2015). Seok claims 
that Mencius’ ideas can enrich moral psychology because he takes the role of the body 
serious. His ideas on empathy are connected to recent scientific insights in mirror 
neurons and considered as an instance of care ethics. It would have been helpful to 
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connect his insights with the current philosophical debate over moral intuitionism but 
Seok convincingly shows how Chinese thought can be useful for understanding 
scientific advances in morality. 
 
3. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS 
The part on political philosophy and ethics is certainly the most controversial and 
thought-provoking of the book. Tongdong Bai critiques the views of John Rawls on 
‘decent hierarchical societies’ (Bai 2015). A decent hierarchical society does not treat 
all persons as free and equal citizens but holds that one group or one religion can hold 
the upper positions of political authority. Bai opposes Rawls’ condescending tone 
when arguing that a liberal democracy should merely tolerate decent hierarchical 
societies. He argues that modern liberal democracies do not deserve the moral high 
ground assigned to them by Rawls. The general public suffers from political ignorance 
to a large extent and this is mainly because modern liberal democracies have become 
too large and diverse to function properly. Bai offers an alternative, Confu-China. 
Confu-China is a hypothetical decent consultation hierarchy based on Confucian ideas. 
Confu-China recognizes most basic liberties liberal democracies have, but differs on 
the role of the state (the state is responsible for the well-being of the people). A more 
radical change in Confu-China is the organization of elections; elections in Confu-
China abandon the ‘one man one vote’-system and opt for a competence-based system. 
Bai thus does not give new arguments for a minority view in Western philosophy; he 
rather gives arguments for a non-existing view in current Western political philosophy. 
This can only help to make the philosophical discussion even broader.  
  Donald Munro follows a similar line of reasoning when arguing for unequal moral 
worth (Munro 2015). He surveys the history of the western idea of equality from Plato 
to Rawls and contrasts it to the Analects of Confucius. According to Munro, the 
Confucian tradition asserts that filiality is the basis of virtue. The result is that family 
members have more value to an individual than outsiders. Modern psychology suggests 
that people indeed feel closer ties towards their kin than towards others. According to 
Munro, there is no real alternative for grounding moral judgments than in emotions, so 
modern psychology vindicates the Confucian position. Munro thus also gives 
arguments for a view that is virtually non-existing in Western moral philosophy. 
  Stephen Angle takes a more conciliatory approach than the previous two articles 
and paves the way for a dialogue between Aristotelian/ Humean virtue ethics and Mou 
Zongsan’s views on self-restriction (Angle 2015). Mou argued that individual should 
restrict their ethical judgment to make political and legal authority possible. According 
to Angle, the idea of self-restriction can help in overcoming problems in Aristotle’s 
and Hume’s account of virtue ethics. The problem is that both Aristotle and Hume 
agree that virtues should be cultivated by individuals and are thus to a large extent 
particular. Both also share the idea that laws of states are universal and hence there is a 
conflict between both. When particular virtues are restricted in the political realm, the 
problem can be overcome. Angle’s article raises a lot of issues, like when is self-
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restriction appropriate and when not, but shows that Chinese thought can help in 
overcoming long-standing problems in Western philosophy. 
  Kong-loi Shun discusses ethical self-commitment by considering the Confucian 
understanding of yi (Shun 2015). In later Confucian thought, yi means distancing 
oneself from situations that can be ethically tainting and correcting such situations 
when they arrive. Yi puts the focus on the self rather than on others in ethical situations. 
Shun thoroughly elaborates on how yi can be relevant for thinking about morality but 
his article misses an engagement with the philosophical discussion on this subject. It 
would have been interesting to let the idea weigh in on Western virtue ethics or moral 
character building. 
  Owen Flanagan and Steven Geisz’s paper discusses an important question in 
current metaethics, namely the question how to ground morality (Flanagan and Geisz 
2015). Western metaethics has long struggled to ground morality without invoking a 
transcendent, personal God who created the moral law. A number of authors like 
Charles Taylor and Alasdair Macintyre even argued that such a project is doomed to 
fail. Flanagan and Geisz claim that classical Confucianism is a clear example of a 
serious moral tradition without any foundation in a God. Flanagan and Geisz argue that 
the whole debate over the need for God in Western metaethics arises out of the 
particular history of the West. Without settling the debate, their paper shows the 
importance of historical contingent factors in some philosophical debates. These 
factors are often neglected in analytic philosophy. 
 
4. METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
The final part may be less controversial but also highlights some major differences 
between Western and Chinese thought. Philip Ivanhoe discusses views of Chinese neo-
Confucian thinkers about oneness (Ivanhoe 2015). In the West, some medieval mystics 
wrote about feelings of oneness but the theme is largely absent from Western 
philosophy. In Chinese philosophy oneness plays a much more prominent role. 
Ivanhoe discusses several senses of oneness. He believes oneness can be useful for 
understanding empathy and altruism. Considering the self as an expanded self can do a 
much better job of explaining these phenomena than the traditional Western atomized 
conception of the self. Ivanhoe does not develop his view of the expanded self much 
further. This would probably have been another challenge to Western philosophy. 
  Brook Ziporyn mounts an all-out attack on one of the central elements of 
traditional Western logic, namely the law of non-contradiction (Ziporyn 2015). 
Whereas most philosophers in the West take the law of non-contradiction as an 
unavoidable starting point or a basic truth, it enjoys no such status in the East. Many 
Buddhist schools of thought explicitly deny the law of non-contradiction. Very recently, 
Western philosophers like Graham Priest have taken up their ideas. Whereas Priest’s 
discussion was largely limited to the Buddhist distinction between conventional and 
ultimate truths, Ziporyn focus on one Chinese Buddhist school, the Tian-Tai, which 
expanded on epistemological ideas of Zhuang Zi. Although the subject matter is 
complex, Ziporyn succeeds in tilting the discussion to a higher level than that of 
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Graham Priest and provides a powerful challenge to the predominance of the law of 
non-contradiction. 
  Another defense of a minority view with new Chinese arguments is Stephen 
Hetherington and Karyn Lai’s defense of prioritizing knowing-how over knowing-that 
(Hetherington and Lai 2015). The priority of knowing-that over knowing-how was 
already criticized by Gilbert Ryle in the 1940s. Hetherington and Lai agree that 
knowing-how cannot be reduced to knowing-that and expand knowing-how to include 
knowing-to; a way of knowing aimed at a certain goal, for example knowing how to 
choose the right words for calming a group. For this purpose, they use a Chinese text, 
the Lü-Shi-Chun-Qiu, as a resource. In their conclusion, Hetherington and Lai voice 
the hope that Western epistemology can be expanded to include a richer concept of 
knowing.  
  Of all the contributions to the volume, Bo Mou’s constructive engagement between 
Willard Van Orman Quine’s naturalized epistemology and Zhuang Zi’s Daoist 
naturalism (Mou 2015) devotes most time to the question whether a dialogue between 
East and West is possible. He claims that before we can have a constructive 
engagement, we first need clarity about what kind of naturalism we are talking about. 
When we understand naturalism as liberal naturalism, which allows for some 
nonscientific and non-physical aspects of nature, a bridge can be built. With this bridge 
in place, Quine’s naturalized epistemology can be enriched by Zhuang Zi on the issue 
of naturalism and normativity and on the relationship of philosophical inquiry to 
science.  
   Brian Bruya discusses the relevance of Xun Zi and Zhuang Zi for the philosophical 
discussion of action without agency (Bruya 2015c). The discussion rose to prominence 
by the works of Harry Frankfurt who argued that humans are only responsible for their 
actions if they know their reasons for action. Others have pointed out that people often 
engage in actions in an unreflective automatic way and are thus unable to give reasons 
for these actions. Yet we often hold people responsible for these actions. Bruya argues 
that Chinese philosophers do not face the same issues because they view natural human 
action as an ideal and natural human action is often unreflective and automatic. Bruya 
suggests that both views can be combined in a unified theory of human action. 
However, it is hard to see what the unified theory would look like since both positions 
are very different and Bruya does not give this unified theory. 
 
5. SUMMARY 
The philosophical challenge from China shows that Western philosophy can certainly 
be enriched and often challenged by Chinese thought. The quality of the papers ranges 
from good to excellent. Readers who expect general information about Chinese 
philosophers will be disappointed but this was never a goal of the book. The book can 
be of interest to philosophers in many subfields and to anyone who is open to non-
Western ideas. 
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